Human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV-1)-based lentiviral vectors are widely used in research laboratories to produce viral particles for gene delivery, drug screening, and HIV replication studies [1, 2] . These safe, non-replication-competent viral particles derive from simultaneous transfection of producer cells with HIV-1 defective expression constructs and autologous/heterologous envelope-encoding plasmids, such as for HIV-1 Env, or vesicular stomatitis virus glycoprotein (VSV-G), the latter being commonly used for its pantropism [3] . Their recognized safety [4] has allowed handling of these non-replication-competent viruses or pseudoviruses in biosafety level (BSL) 2 conditions [5, 6] .
Here we describe a case of HIV-1 infection that occurred during HIV-1 pseudovirus production in a BSL-2 containment facility, due to unaware contamination of these procedures with a replication-competent recombinant clone.
CASE REPORT
A blood donor was found to be HIV-1 infected at routine screening. Previous tests (the latest 7 months before) were negative. At first clinical assessment, investigating the HIV acquisition route, no classical risk factors emerged. However, during the 6 months preceding HIV-1 diagnosis, the subject worked in a research laboratory, with the exclusive task of producing pseudoviruses by co-transfecting 293T cells with HIV-1 NL4-3 env/nef-defective, green fluorescent proteinlabeled vector, and JR-Frontal Lobe (JRFL) Env-or VSV-Gencoding plasmid in a BSL-2 containment facility. No access to BSL-3 was allowed or reported. No major or minor laboratory accidents (percutaneous injury, medium splash, breaking of gloves, eye or skin contact with cell-derived medium, etc) were recalled.
METHODS

Ethical Statement
After Institutional and Ethics Committee approval, the patient gave written informed consent for all the analyses and the publication of this report.
Viroimmunological Parameters
Plasma HIV RNA and CD4 + cell count were evaluated every 4 months from diagnosis. Total HIV DNA was measured at month 12 [7] .
HIV-1 Sequencing
HIV-1 from plasma and peripheral blood mononuclear cells (PBMCs) was sequenced and analyzed at different time points by bulk and ultra-deep pyrosequencing (UDPS).
Phylogenetic Analysis
Maximum-likelihood (ML) methods [8] , using the full-length HIV DNA sequence (month 12), were applied to define the infectious source. Viral evolution was evaluated through the ratio of substitution rates at non-synonymous and synonymous sites (dN/dS), number of Env-glycosylation sites, and co-receptor usage at different time points.
Viral Isolation, Phenotypic Determination, and Neutralizing Activity Assessment
Thirty-six months postdiagnosis, the virus was isolated from the patient's PBMCs and phenotypically characterized on U87. CD4 + cells expressing CCR5 and CXCR4 [9] . The patient's neutralizing antibody response was assessed by testing the virus for sensitivity to patient's sera collected at different time points, and to a panel of monoclonal antibodies (mAbs) [10] .
Immunological Characterization
At month 36, cytometric analyses were performed on HIV peptide-stimulated and unstimulated PBMCs. The full methodology is shown in Supplementary Tables 1 and 2 .
RESULTS
Viral Sequence Characterization
At HIV-1 diagnosis, Western blot was positive to Env, Pol, Gag, and low-reactive to p31. CD4 + cell count and plasma HIV-1
RNA were 577 cells/μL and 119 (2.1 log 10 ) copies/mL, respectively (Supplementary Figure 1) . The full-length sequencing showed the presence of a whole HIV-1 genome. The ML phylogenetic trees inferred from gag-pol, vif-vpr-vpu-tat/rev (first exon), and nef sequences demonstrated that in these 3 regions the patient's virus formed well-supported clusters with NL4-3 (bootstrap: 100%, 100%, and 97.8%, respectively; Figure 1 ). The high homology with NL4-3 was confirmed by the extremely low genetic distance between the 2 strains: 0.004 ± 0.001 for gag-pol, 0.008 ± 0.003 for vifvpr-vpu-tat/rev (first exon), and 0.006 ± 0.003 for nef. The few amino acid changes from NL4-3 reference sequence in accessory genes are shown in Supplementary Table 3 .
In contrast, the ML tree obtained by the full-length env and tat/rev (second exon) revealed that the patient's virus formed a well-supported cluster with JRFL (bootstrap: 99.7%; genetic distance: 0.017 ± 0.002; Figure 1 ).
Although the phylogenetic results showed a high homology between the patient's virus and the HIV-1 constructs he/she was supposed to have handled, the presence of nef in the patient's virus suggested that the source of infection should not have been the recombination between HIV-1 NL4-3 env/nef-defective vector and 
A retrospective evaluation of the clones present in the laboratory at that time identified an HIV-1 NL4-3/JRFL plasmid, with a backbone of NL4-3, and an env of JRFL, handled in the BSL-3 of the same laboratory by other researchers for other experimental purposes. We presume that this plasmid erroneously but unknowingly entered in the BSL-2.
Tropism Characterization
Serial plasma and PBMC V3 UDPS showed predominant R5 viruses; only at month 36 did 2 minority species emerge, with a false-positive-rate <10% (below the cutoff to predict R5 tropism) and the mutation S11D, at position important for coreceptor binding (Supplementary Table 4 ). This mutation was also present in the virus isolated from the patient's PBMCs at month 36 (Supplementary Figure 2) . This virus exhibited an R5 phenotypic tropism in U87 cells, despite a false-positive rate of 8.1% at genotypic assay, suggesting that this single mutation, in this particular backbone, is not probably enough to determine X4 phenotype.
Virus Sensitivity to Autologous Serum and Monoclonal Antibodies
The patient's sera were unable to neutralize the patient's primary virus, but neutralized the pseudovirus JRFL at high titers. The neutralization assay performed with mAbs showed a high sensitivity of the patient's virus to gp120-directed mAbs PG9 and PG16 but less to b12, 2G12, or the gp41-directed mAbs 2F5 and 4E10 (Supplementary Table 5 ). The pseudovirus JRFL showed an inverse pattern of neutralization sensitivity. This may suggest an escape of autologous virus through evolution. Indeed, env sequencing at different time points showed a substantial C2/ V3 env modifications (defined by the increasing dN/dS ratio, which varied from 0.00 at month 4 to 2.00 at month 36, and by the heterogeneity of V3 quasispecies) (Supplementary Table 4) . Serial gag and nef sequencing also revealed a genetic evolution (dN/dS ratio: 0.00 and 0.01 at month 12, and 0.22 and 0.63 at month 36, respectively), and the emergence of amino acid changes at critical residues for cytotoxic T-lymphocyte escape (Supplementary Table 3 ).
Immunological Characterization
Peripheral immune activation, higher in the patient than in healthy controls, the skewed distribution of CD4 + and CD8 + subpopulations observed in the patient, and the higher percentage of TNF-α/IFN-γ-producing CD8 + cells perforin and granzyme-expressing CD8 + cells observed after stimulation with
Gag and Env predicted a high cytotoxic effector potential, and did not differentiate this case from the typical clinical course of HIV infection (Supplementary Table 6 ).
Clinical Follow-up
At month 36, CD4 + cell counts fell below 400 cells/μL and plasma HIV RNA increased to 20 208 (4.3 log 10 ) copies/mL.
Following the guidelines of that time, antiretroviral therapy with tenofovir/emtricitabine/rilpivirine was started; viral suppression was achieved at week 10, and maintained thereafter (Supplementary Figure 1) .
DISCUSSION
Here we describe for the first time an HIV-1 infection of a laboratory worker with a replication-competent recombinant clone, which was erroneously and inadvertently introduced in a BSL-2 containment facility during routine experiments of HIV-1 pseudovirus production. The relevant novelty, which differentiates this case from other rare laboratory accidents (where laboratory workers consciously had handled infectious viral cultures) [11] is that the patient described here was supposed to exclusively manage constructs that were per se noninfectious, with restrictions for BSL-2, and that an unaware contamination by a recombinant clone caused the infection. Initial viral load and CD4 + count dynamics depicted a slow progression during the first 2.5 years. The subsequent viroimmunological deterioration, the successful escape from host immune system, and the marked genetic evolution (documented with the modification in gag, nef, and env, including the heterogeneity of V3 quasispecies) reveal that a pure laboratory recombinant clone has adapted to a human host encountered for the first time, thus determining a progressive HIV-1 infection. This case is disturbing for the unexplained route of virus transmission. An in-depth retrospective examination of the events did not recall any accident nor any type of evident minor exposure to the source of infection. In this respect, we wonder if VSV-G may have played a favoring role. It was previously demonstrated that the plasmid encoding for VSV-G allows to obtain pantropic viral particles able to deliver the expression construct to a wide range of mammalian and nonmammalian target cells [3] , thus dramatically enhancing viral infectivity. Previous studies have demonstrated that HIV-1 produced in cells infected with VSV-G gives rise to phenotypically mixed virions with an expanded host range [12, 13] . Thus, it is conceivable that if the infectious HIV-1 NL4-3/JRFL plasmid, instead of the HIV-1 NL4-3 env/nef-defective vector, was erroneously transfected with VSV-G plasmid into producer cells, hybrid virions containing the VSV-G and the full HIV-1 genome might have been generated. This could have expanded viral tropism, augmented viral infectivity, and extremely facilitated infection, so that even unperceived droplets of supernatant of a high-level replicating hybrid viral culture, inadvertently coming in contact with mucous membranes, may have caused an accidental, unaware infection.
Despite intensive investigation, the lack of identification of the "breach-point" that led to contamination and the mode of transmission that remains obscure hinder the full comprehension of this accident.
Notwithstanding these limitations, this case warns of potential hazard in research laboratories where multiple HIVderived constructs are managed: BSL-2 laboratories are often large spaces occupied by many laboratory personnel working on different lists of projects (also conducted in BSL-3) and sharing laboratory equipment. A precise risk assessment and procedure control, applied to every research project, could contribute to minimize biohazards and at best prevent laboratory exposures.
Supplementary Data
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